The Software Stack

• The modern software stack is one of mankind’s greatest engineering achievements

• With a few keystrokes, we can send email, make video calls, edit images, operate factories, control air traffic, and manage sensitive data.

• But this power comes with a price: a large attack surface where bugs can have serious consequences.

• Estimated engineering cost of software errors for the US is around 2.41T $/year.

• Cybercrime is seen as a 6T$/year problem, and growing

https://appvance.com/wp-content/uploads/Software-Stack.001.jpeg
What Makes Software Weird?

• Unlike other engineering artifacts, software supports greater flexibility, resiliency, and versatility in the design and maintenance of a system

• However, software can be a significant source of system failure due to bugs and security vulnerabilities - even a small design, coding error, or malicious modification can have big consequences

• Software applications tend to be sui generis - we lack a mature engineering discipline of principled software construction

• Attackers can relentlessly probe software for vulnerabilities and compromise security and reliability

• The resulting attacks can wreak havoc on a global scale

• To secure the software supply chain, we need to invest in design and composable assurance, and not band-aids.

A Few Celebrity Bugs

• AT&T Cascading Failure (1990)
• Intel FDIV bug (1994)
• Ariane-5 launch (1996)
• Patriot Missile bug (1991)
• Northeast blackout (2003)
• Obamacare web site
• OpenSSL RNG
• OpenSSL Heartbleed
• Therac-25
• Boeing 737 MAX-8
• Mars Climate Orbiter
• Apple Maps
• Windows Genuine Advantage

Cost Overruns

• FAA Advanced Automation System (>$3B)
• HealthCare.gov ($1.5B vs 93M)
What can go wrong?

- Software-intensive systems must possess a stringent suite of **virtues** spanning functionality, performance, reliability, robustness, resilience, persistence, security, and maintainability.

- For safety, the design must mitigate all possible **hazards**, conditions for potentially dangerous events (fires, crashes, societal collapse) caused by failure(s).

- A **failure** is a deviation from the **intended behavior** caused by **errors** in the functioning of one or more components, due to **faults** such as a bad or missing check in the software.

- Failures can arise from a combination of many sources: poor regulation, inept management, incomplete/ambiguous requirements, bad design, defective engineering, inadequate maintenance, and improper operation.

The cost of finding/fixing faults rises dramatically through the software development lifecycle.

## Software-Related Risks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Instances</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hardware</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Side Channel</td>
<td>Power, timing, radiation, wear-and-tear (Row Hammer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calculation</td>
<td>NASA Mariner, Mars Polar Lander, Mars Climate Orbiter, Ariane-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory/Type</td>
<td>Buffer Overflow, null dereference, uninitialized variable, use-after-free, double-free, bad cast, ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>SHA-1, MD5, TLS Freak/Logjam/SMACK/SLOTH, Needham-Schroder, Kerberos, Colonial Pipeline</td>
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<tr>
<td>Input Validation</td>
<td>SQL/Format string, X.509 certificates, Heartbleed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Reset condition</td>
<td>Therac-25, North American Blackout, AT&amp;T crash of 1990, Mars Pathfinder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code injection/reuse</td>
<td>Shell injection, Return-oriented Programming, Jump-oriented programming</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provenance/Backdoor</td>
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# Software-Related Risks: The Enemy is Us

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What then shall we do?

• Many vulnerabilities are consequences of original sins: conflating call and variable stacks, stack abuse, heap abuse, broken abstractions, weak memory/cache access protections, nonstandard calling conventions, poor file/network abstractions, etc. Expiating these sins must be a priority.

• Formal modeling and analysis is practical and even necessary, but not a panacea

• Software should be designed hand-in-hand with assurance artifacts that are verifiable by clients (or trusted third parties)

• Design for assurance must be based on efficient (fail-big, fail-easy) compositional arguments with low amortized certification cost

• Software designs ought to be centered around software architectures (formal models of computation & interaction) that deliver efficient arguments for isolation and composition

• Software development workflows must capture design refinements while maintaining the associated claims and evidence (the value proposition).
The RAF Nimrod XV230 Accident

• On 2 September 2006, RAF Nimrod XV230 “suffered a catastrophic mid-air fire" while flying in Helmand province, Afghanistan.

• All fourteen people aboard the plane died.

• The fire happened 90 seconds following air-to-air refuelling (AAR).

• The cause of the fire was a fuel leak around the AAR that was ignited by contact with an exposed (due to frayed/inadequate insulation) element of the cross-feed (CF) duct (1969-75) and Supplementary Conditioning Pack (SCP) duct (1979-84) that transported hot (470 deg. C) air.
What went wrong?

- The Nimrod, developed from the de Havilland Comet, had been flying since 1969 but the AAR was added by BAE first in 1982 and upgraded in 1989, and certified on the basis of a safety case developed by BAE (with QinetiQ as an independent reviewer) during 2001-2004.

- The Haddon-Cave report observed that the cross-feed duct was placed dangerously close to a fuel tank:

  As a matter of good engineering practice, it would be extremely unusual (to put it no higher) to co-locate an exposed source of ignition with a potential source of fuel, unless it was designated a fire zone and provided with commensurate protection. Nevertheless, this is what occurred within the Nimrod.
Haddon-Cave on the Nimrod Safety Case

• Unfortunately, the Nimrod Safety Case was a lamentable job from start to finish. It was riddled with errors. It missed the key dangers. Its production is a story of incompetence, complacency, and cynicism.

• The Nimrod Safety Case process was fatally undermined by a general malaise: a widespread assumption by those involved that the Nimrod was ‘safe anyway’ (because it had successfully flown for 30 years) and the task of drawing up the Safety Case became essentially a paperwork and ‘tick-box’ exercise.

• A Safety Case itself is defined as “a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given environment”.

• The basic aims, purpose and underlying philosophy of Safety Cases were clearly defined, but there was limited practical guidance as to how, in fact, to go about constructing a Safety Case. ... If the Nimrod Safety Case had been properly carried out, the loss of XV230 would have been avoided.
Evidence-Based Assurance

Adelard describes an assurance case as “a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a specified set of critical claims about a system’s properties are adequately justified for a given application in a given environment.”

FDA Draft Guidance document Total Product Life Cycle: Infusion Pump - Premarket Notification [510(k)] Submissions: ... an assurance case is a formal method for demonstrating the validity of a claim by providing a convincing argument together with supporting evidence. It is a way to structure arguments to help ensure that top-level claims are credible and supported. In an assurance case, many arguments, with their supporting evidence, may be grouped under one top-level claim. For a complex case, there may be a complex web of arguments and sub-claims.

Gold components are verified; Green ones are assumptions/models supported by empirical evidence.
Software Assurance

• Since software is a source of catastrophic bugs and vulnerabilities, it must be certified as being fit for its intended purpose prior to deployment.

• An assurance case captures the rationale for the claim that the software is fit for its intended purpose.


• Counter to process-based standards, Overarching Properties (OP) takes a property-based approach focusing on intent, correctness, and innocuity.

The Possibility of Perfection

• Software and hardware behavior can be modeled with mathematical precision.
• Software can, in principle, be provably engineered to perfection (modulo messy reality) given accurate specifications.
• Building accurate models, capturing requirements, and crafting specifications are critical challenges for software.
• Even so, the strategic deployment of lightweight and heavyweight analysis techniques can yield huge dividends.
• The main bottleneck is design, and even verified software can be poorly designed.

Formal Verification Milestones

• CLinc verified stack (1989)
• SPARK/Ada verification of avionics, medical device, air traffic control, crypto software
• NASA Langley verification of air traffic control algorithms/software (2004)
• NRL Separation Kernel (2007)
• CompCert verified compiler for subset of C (2008)
• Intel i7 processor verification (2009)
• seL4 microkernel verification (2010)
• Airbus 340 & 380 avionics software (2010)
• CakeML hardware/software stack (2014)
• Everest verified HTTPS, TLS code (2017)
On Design

• A design is a blueprint for the construction and operation of a system or artifact.

• The design can be decomposed into what is fixed: structure and semantics, and what is allowed to vary and how: dynamics.
  • Structure specifies the architecture (components, interfaces, and bindings) of a specific design.
  • Semantics specifies how the individual components act and interact.
  • Dynamics specify the (time-varying) variables in the systems.

• For critical systems, the end goal of a design process should be more than a blueprint
  • It should include an argument supported by evidence as to why the design meets its objectives.

On Argument

- An argument for a system is a tree of claims, subclaims, and assumptions.
- An assurance case is a theory-supported structured argument with claims, subclaims, and assumptions backed by artifacts and evidence, that demonstrates that the software faithfully implements the intended behavior.
- The assumptions, e.g., on the environment or sensors, are supported by evidence.
- The refinement of claims into subclaims should be backed by a theory (with its own supporting evidence).
- A good argument should make it easy to identify and fix fallacious reasoning steps.
Making Arguments Efficient (for the skeptic)

• An efficient argument is one whose flaws, if any, can be easily identified by a skeptic.

• A good design should support an efficient argument that expands the falsification space for the skeptic.

• Efficiency is measured by the amortized cost of falsification.

• Inefficient arguments are hard to falsify for a number of reasons: imprecise claims, unfalsifiable assumptions, complex technical arguments, flawed or irrelevant evidence, invalid chain of reasoning, leaps of faith, improper tracking of change.
Design for Efficient Arguments

https://i.pinimg.com/736x/d6/e7/54/d6e754d24aaef324c1595e68583ace7a.jpg
Design for Efficient Arguments

Efficient arguments use
• Precise Claims
• Valid models and assumptions
• Reusable design tools/artifacts
• Architectural separation of concerns
• Rigorous chains of reasoning and evidence

• Models (plant, environment, sensor, actuator, operator, platform, fault), Architectures, Languages, and Tools are the pillars of efficient arguments
• Efficient arguments lower the amortized falsification cost through big, reusable claims that expand the falsification space.

All models are wrong, but some are useful.
George E.P. Box
Designing for Efficiency

• Assurance-driven workflow for continuously/incrementally capturing evidence during design
  • No gaps in the chain of evidence.

• Property-directed assurance (in contrast to process-based assurance)
  • Software failure can be directly traced to property violation.

• Architecture based on a rigorous model of computation and interaction
  • Model offers high-level guarantees that are reusable over multiple designs.

• Separation of logical and physical architecture
  • Logical architecture is reusable, easy to check that physical architecture meets logical assumptions.

• Component contract specifications
  • Behavioral properties are established from architecture and component contracts.

• Abstract component models
  • Strong semantics + easier proofs.

• Static analysis for generic properties (e.g., absence of runtime errors)
  • Amortized cost of using type system or analyzer.

• Ontic (what the data represents) type analysis for consistent data representation and use
  • Efficient check for ontic mismatches.

• Automatic code generation from models
  • Generator is reusable and easily verified.
Property-Directed Assurance
The Eight-Variables Model

EnvironmentAssumption\((\text{environment})\) AND
PlantModel\((\text{environment, control, pose, monitor})\) AND
SensorAccuracy\((\text{monitor, input})\) AND
ActuatorResponse\((\text{output, control})\) AND
ControllerSpecification\((\text{input, command, output, display})\) AND
OperatorModel\((\text{display, command})\)
IMPLIES
Requirement\((\text{command, environment, pose, display})\)

The Controller Specification can be seen as the High-Level Requirement (HLR) on the software.
The Plant consists of the vehicle that is trying to maintain a speed $v$ and the Environment $e$ is the grade of the road.

The goal requirement is to maintain the vehicle velocity $v$ within some bound of the target velocity $u$.

There are other ways to decompose the interaction:
- Operator as part of the World
- Actuator and Sensor as part of the Plant
- Actuator and Sensor as part of the Controller
Radler Architecture for Efficient Arguments

Requirements:
Maintain room temperature between min and max.

Assumptions:
Leakage rate, heater, sensor accuracy.

Logical Radler Architecture:
Sensor + Controller + Console + Safety Monitor + Channel Latencies

Physical architecture:
Machines, VMs, OS, Transport, Configuration

Radler logical architecture guarantees
- Message ordering
- Bounded/zero message loss
- End-to-end latency bounds
- Failure warnings
- No DoS attacks
- Partitioning

Assumptions + Architecture => Requirements
- Architecture = Logical Arch. + Physical Arch.
- Logical Architecture = Nodes + Channels + Timing
- Node = Step function contract + Mailboxes + Period
- Physical Architecture => Logical Arch. Assumptions
- Code => Step function contract + WCET bounds

Radler build process ensures the architectural integrity of executables.

https://github.com/SRI-CSL/radler/
Ontology for Safety and Security Assurance

1. Without a rigorous ontology, the claims and chain of evidence in an assurance case can be ambiguous and misleading.

2. Honeywell’s **CLEAR** language is used to capture both requirements and **ontology elements and their relationships** to create corresponding evidence sets and reasoning for direct construction of **Assurance Claims**.

E.g.: **Threat A1**’s exploiting of **vulnerabilities (v1, v2)** is blocked due to controls (c1, c2, c3) present (with associated property results) in the architecture (rad1) in software components (s1, s2).

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<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Entry Point</th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malicious Code</td>
<td>Build Process</td>
<td>Failure, Unauthorized Access</td>
<td>Radler Certified Build/Attestation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of Information Integrity</td>
<td>Tampering</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Radler Security Enclaves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of Comm. integrity</td>
<td>Communication layer</td>
<td>Infiltration, Exfiltration, Jamming</td>
<td>Radler/SROS2 protections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access Control Violation</td>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td>Failure, Unauthorized Access</td>
<td>Radler config., Ontic analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad/Unexpected Input</td>
<td>Unchecked input ports</td>
<td>Failure/Remote Code Execution</td>
<td>Ontic Type Analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DesCert Evidence Ontology for Integrated Security/Safety Analysis

- Architectural design protection (partitioning, enclaves, encryption, secure DDS, resource/timing guarantees)
- Requirements/design analysis, model check properties, graph semantics analysis
- Protection via type safety and ontic-type-based static code analysis
- Testing: requirements-based, threat-based

Legend
- Security related (Phase 2)
- Safety related (Phase 1)
- Activity
Ontic Type Analysis

• Basic types in programming language (such as int, struct, array) abstract from the representation of the data
• They are insensitive to what the data represents or its use, e.g., an authenticated user ID, a private encryption key, the vertical acceleration of a vehicle in m/sec\(^2\), an IP address, a URL, or an SQL query. Example shows tainted input reaching a sensitive operation.

```c
char input[30];
int response;
scanf("%s", input);
sqlstmt = "select * from employees where id = " + input + ";";
response = sqlite3_exec(db, sqlstmt, ...);
```

• Ontic type analysis (see Checker Framework from U.Washington) checks for the proper usage of data in terms of units/dimensions, freshness, nullity, mutability, taint, authentication, privacy, format validity, and provenance.
Generating Safe Code From Models

- SRI’s Prototype Verification System (PVS) is an interactive proof assistant built and maintained over the last thirty years.
- Almost all of the specification language is executable as a safe functional language.
- Executable PVS specifications can be mapped to Common Lisp, C, Rust, and oCaml.
- The generated C is safe (free of uninitialized variables, null dereferences, out-of-bounds accesses, division-by-zero).
- It is also comparable in efficiency to handcrafted code due to the use of reference counting and in-place updates.

https://pvs.csl.sri.com/

```plaintext
hsummation: THEORY
BEGIN
  i, m, n: VAR nat
  f: VAR [nat -> nat]

  hsum(f)(n): RECURSIVE nat =
    (IF n = 0 THEN 0 ELSE f(n - 1) + hsum(f)(n - 1) ENDIF)
    MEASURE n

  id(n): nat = n

  hsum_id: LEMMA hsum(id)(n + 1) = (n * (n + 1)) / 2

  square(n): nat = n * n

  sum_of_squares: LEMMA
    6 * hsum(square)(n + 1) = n * (n + 1) * (2 * n + 1)

  cube(n): nat = n * n * n

  sum_of_cubes: LEMMA
    4 * hsum(cube)(n + 1) = n * n * (n + 1) * (n + 1)

  quart(n): nat = square(square(n))

  sum_of_quarts: LEMMA
    hsum(quart)(n + 1) =
      ((6 * (n ^ 5)) + (15 * (n ^ 4)) + (10 * (n ^ 3)) - n) / 30

END hsummation
```
Key Derivation in PVS: HMAC

function hmac is
  input:
  key: Bytes // Array of bytes
  message: Bytes // Array of bytes to be hashed
  hash: Function // The hash function to use (e.g. SHA-1)
  blockSize: Integer // The block size of the hash function
  // (e.g. 64 bytes for SHA-1)
  outputSize: Integer // The output size of the hash function
  // (e.g. 20 bytes for SHA-1)
  // Keys longer than blockSize are shortened by hashing them
  if (length(key) > blockSize) then
    key ← hash(key) // key is outputSize bytes long
  // Keys shorter than blockSize are padded to blockSize by padding
  // with zeros on the right
  if (length(key) < blockSize) then
    key ← Pad(key, blockSize) // Pad key with zeros to make it
    // blockSize bytes long
  o_key_pad ← key xor [0x5c * blockSize] // Outer padded key
  i_key_pad ← key xor [0x36 * blockSize] // Inner padded key
  return hash(o_key_pad || hash(i_key_pad || message))

hmac(blockSize: uint8,
      key : bytestring,
      (message : bytestring | message’ length + blockSize < bytestring_bound),
      outputSize: upto(blockSize),
      hash: [bytestring->lbytes(outputSize))]: lbytes(outputSize)
  = LET newkey = IF length(key) > blockSize THEN hash(key) ELSE key ENDIF,
    newerkey: lbytes(blockSize)
    = IF length(newkey) < blockSize
      THEN padright(blockSize)(newkey)
      ELSE newkey
    ENDIF,
    oKeyPad = lbytesXOR(blockSize)(newerkey, nbytes(0x5c, blockSize)),
    iKeyPad = lbytesXOR(blockSize)(newerkey, nbytes(0x36, blockSize))
  IN hash(oKeyPad ++ hash(iKeyPad ++ message))

hmac256((blockSize: uint8 | 32 <= blockSize),
         key : bytestring,
         (message : bytestring | message’ length + blockSize < bytestring_bound)):
  lbytes(32) = hmac(blockSize, key, message, 32, sha256message)

• HMAC is a higher-order operation with complex type dependencies (not specified in the pseudocode)
• These dependencies are accurately captured in PVS
• C code generation is bit-accurate

From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAC
AES (Rijndael) in PVS

Rijndael_step(A, K): byv[16] =
(LET A1 = byteSubst(A),
A2 = shiftRow(A1),
A3 = mixColumn(A2)
IN roundkeyXOR(A3, K))

Rijndael_rec(A, KK, (i : below(11))): RECURSIVE byv[16] =
(IF i >= 10 THEN roundkeyXOR(shiftRow(byteSubst(A)), KK(i))
ELSIF i = 0 THEN Rijndael_rec(roundkeyXOR(A, KK(i)), KK, i + 1)
ELSE LET A4 = Rijndael_step(A, KK(i))
IN Rijndael_rec(A4, KK, i + 1)
ENDIF)
MEASURE 10 - I

Rijndael(A, K): byv[16] =
Rijndael_rec(A, allKeys((LAMBDA (k: below(11)): K), 1, 0), 0)

Rijndael_array_2_t Rijndael_array_2_t Rijndael_step(Rijndael_array_2_t ivar_2,
Rijndael_array_2_t ivar_3) {
Rijndael_array_2_t result;
/* A1 */ Rijndael_array_2_t ivar_4;
Rijndael_array_2_t ivar_6;
ivar_6 = (Rijndael_array_2_t) Rijndael__byteSubst((Rijndael_array_2_t) ivar_2);
//copying to Rijndael_array_2 from Rijndael_array_2;
ivar_4 = (Rijndael_array_2_t) ivar_6;
if (ivar_4 != NULL) ivar_4->count++;
release_Rijndael_array_2(ivar_6);
/* A2 */ Rijndael_array_2_t ivar_8;
Rijndael_array_2_t ivar_10;
ivar_10 = (Rijndael_array_2_t) Rijndael__shiftRow((Rijndael_array_2_t) ivar_4);
//copying to Rijndael_array_2 from Rijndael_array_2;
ivar_8 = (Rijndael_array_2_t) ivar_10;
if (ivar_8 != NULL) ivar_8->count++;
release_Rijndael_array_2(ivar_10);
/* A3 */ Rijndael_array_2_t ivar_12;
Rijndael_array_2_t ivar_14;
ivar_14 = (Rijndael_array_2_t) Rijndael__mixColumn((Rijndael_array_2_t) ivar_8);
//copying to Rijndael_array_2 from Rijndael_array_2;
ivar_12 = (Rijndael_array_2_t) ivar_14;
if (ivar_12 != NULL) ivar_12->count++;
release_Rijndael_array_2(ivar_14);
Rijndael_array_2_t ivar_18;
ivar_18 = (Rijndael_array_2_t) Rijndael__roundkeyXOR((Rijndael_array_2_t) ivar_12,
(Rijndael_array_2_t) ivar_3);
//copying to Rijndael_array_2 from Rijndael_array_2;
result = (Rijndael_array_2_t) ivar_18;
if (result != NULL) result->count++;
release_Rijndael_array_2(ivar_18);

return result; }
PVS2C bridges the gap between a functional and imperative language by converting PVS functions into A-Normal Form (ANF) and translating the ANF into imperative code with reference counting.

- Multi-precision rational numbers and integers, and floats
- Fixed-size arithmetic: `uint8`, `uint16`, `uint32`, `uint64`, `int8`, `int16`, `int32`, `int64`, with safe casting
- Dependent (dynamically sized) and infinite arrays
- Dependent records and tuples
- Higher-order functions and closures (with updates)
- Characters (ASCII and Unicode) and strings
- Algebraic datatypes
- Parametric theories with type parameters (unboxed polymorphism)
- Memory-mapped File I/O
- Semantic attachments/Foreign function interface
- JSON representation for data
Evidential Tool Bus (ETB2) [SRI/fortiss]

- The Evidential Tool Bus (ETB) is a distributed tool integration framework for constructing and maintaining claims supported by arguments based on evidence generated by static analyzers, dynamic analyzers, satisfiability solvers, model checkers, and theorem provers.
- Key ideas are:
  - Datalog as a metalanguage
  - Denotational and operational semantics
  - Interpreted predicates for tool invocation, and uninterpreted predicates for scripts
  - Datalog inference trees as proofs
  - Git as a medium for file identity and version control
  - Cyberlogic, a logic of attestations, to authenticate the claims and authorize the services

https://github.com/SRI-CSL/ETB2

allsat(F, Answers) :- sat(F, M), negateModel(F, M, NewF), allsat(NewF, T), cons(M, T, Answers).
allsat(F, Answers) :- unsat(F), assign("nil", Answers).
sat(F, M) :- yices(F, S, M), equals(S, "sat").
unsat(F) :- yices(F, S, M), equals(S, "unsat").
# Evidential Transactions on ETB

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<th>Implementation</th>
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<td><strong>Logical Foundations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proof theoretic and operational semantics</td>
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<td>Evidential Tool Bus</td>
<td><strong>Services</strong></td>
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<td>How to generate and continuously maintain evidential transactions?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Verifiable Evidential Transactions</td>
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![Diagram](image)
The Elephant in the Room

- AI safety is not a new concern.
- McCarthy wanted AI that could reason, reflect, and explain.
- Lisp was designed to support reasoning and reflection.
- He wanted AI that could be trained through rules as well as data.
- Many AI algorithms (search, planning, learning, etc.) can and have been verified.
- Modern deep learning algorithms are trained/programmed by data and generally resist easy verification or explanation: they do what they do (often with breathtaking confidence).
- Not an entirely new problem: we have similar issues with sensors that can deliver bad/biased estimates.

[Source](https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.03305)
What to do about the Elephant in the Room

• Use AI for optimization within a safe non-AI envelope.
• Attack AI components, to demonstrate their flaws, e.g., adversarial testing using gradient ascent.
• Stress-test the components to ensure that they operate without error and/or bias.
• Check the training data for bias and error.
• Check inputs for adversarial corruption.
• Train on synthetic data that is free of bias, error, and corruption

• Verify the correctness of the outputs; counter-example guided iteration.
• Embed safety and robustness into the training goals.
• Verify safety/robustness directly or through conservative approximations.
• Treat the AI components as statistical inputs, e.g., sensors, and ensembles minimize the impact of errors.
• Ensure that AI components only assist humans in making critical judgements.
Summing up

• Design is the key to building software that is demonstrably safe, reliable, and secure software.
  • Open Problem: How do we shift the locus of software design from code to models?
• Designs based on efficient arguments makes certification easier and more reusable.
  • Open Problem: How do we quantify efficiency by assessing relative certification cost, confidence, and amortization gain of different design choices
• Concrete ways of achieving efficiency include formal architectures, certified build systems, well-defined property/evidence ontologies, strong typing (including ontic types), code generators, and assurance-directed workflows.
  • Open Problem: Can we create a usable, fully formal pipeline for continuous development/assurance?
Securing the Software Universe

• Software processes information: bank accounts, grades, medical records, books, videos, power grid controls, avionics, and medical devices

• Code is a poor representation of design: untrusted code should not be the input, trusted code should be the output

• Shotgun composition of code without a well-defined formal architecture will fail

• So, we need to
  • Take information seriously: annotate the artifacts with ontic type information
  • Take requirements seriously: many major flaws are traceable to poor requirements
  • Take architecture seriously: the keystone of an efficient argument
  • Take assurance seriously: composable evidence should be the coin of the realm
  • Take the assurance ontology seriously: it binds the claims to the evidence
  • Take inline and independent runtime monitoring seriously: track integrity of assumptions
  • Re-engineer the platforms to root out the sins of our ancestors
  • Build workflows that create and maintain evidence as part of the design flow
  • Integrate attestation into the evidence as a foundation for trust
A Software Proof of Virtues (SPOV)

- Software is a core intermediary for our perception of truth
- Software failures and cyber-attacks weaken trust
- The current strategy of applying larger and larger band-aids only fuels a cyber-arms race while weakening protections
- We have the tools and insights to build the infrastructure of trust in software from the ground up:
  - Software development lifecycle workflows that continuously maintain both process and outcome-based assurance evidence
  - Tools and models that support designs annotated with traceable ontic information that are founded on efficient arguments
  - Verified platforms and services whose integrity is certified by audit logs and audits
  - Composable assurance cases validating intent, correctness, and innocuity